DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

May 4, 2007

| MEMORANDUM FOR: | J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director |
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| FROM: | J. S. Contardi/M.T. Sautman, SRS Site Representatives |
| SUBJECT: | SRS Report for Week Ending May 4, 2007 |

K-Area Interim Surveillance (KIS): The KIS contractor operational readiness review (ORR) team completed their assessment this week. The team identified 33 findings of which there were 37 pre-start corrective actions. The findings included inadequacies in the training program, radiological control practices, procedure quality, and conduct of operations. Following closure and validation of the pre-start findings, the DOE ORR will commence on May 14.

H Tank Farms: The Site Rep observed Actinide Recovery Process cold runs including the startup of the Process Vessel Vent and Chiller systems as well as monosodium titanate additions to the strike tank. The Site Rep also found a fire door to the 3H Control Room propped open with a trash can although a posting clearly prohibited blocking the fire door.

Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF): A steam coil leak in the Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME) was discovered in April. The SME was not able to be repaired because the coil guides were very eroded and a backup guide plate had shifted 29 degrees and could not be removed. The Site Rep watched a video inspection of the SME and saw the replacement SME vessel, the flatbed to be used to transport it to DWPF, and the waste box for the current SME. The contractor expects to complete the replacement of the SME vessel by May 18.

Lockout/Tagout: Two inadequate lockouts were identified at DWPF. An outlet damper was locked out instead of the inlet damper. In the second case, work performed after installation of the chain and hasp introduced enough slack in the chain such that it could be slipped over the valve handle. In L Area, voltage was detected during the safe energy state determination after a lockout was installed. The contractor has since determined that a power source was overlooked during development of the lockout.

Modular Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU): The salt simulant was determined to be useable and was filtered three times to remove sodium aluminosilicates. While the impacts to the MCU process are being evaluated, it mostly appears to be a simulant issue (Site Rep weekly 4/13/07).

Transuranic (TRU) Waste: Transuranic waste remediation was suspended temporarily in F-Canyon after the waste enclosure received a low differential pressure alarm, probably due to zeolite dust loading up the roughing filters. As a result of last week's event, all beryllium drums were labeled and beryllium surveys were conducted for all TRU waste remediation areas as well as other processing areas in which previous contamination events had occurred.

Saltstone: The facility has exited a planned outage and contractor personnel conducted several small processing runs using leachate returned from the vault.